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Abstract— Physically unclonable functions leverage
process variation in the manufacture of silicon chips
and circuit boards to map inputs to outputs in an
irreversible and unpredictable but consistent manner.
They have many applications as security primitives:
they can serve as truly random number generators,
create secret keys, and fingerprint specific chips.
These primitive functions can then be used to secure confidential information and regulate access to
private resources. Current approaches tend to utilize
variation in the production of silicon dies as the
source of variability in their function’s output. We
present a PUF that leverages variation in the entire
circuit board’s power delivery network to produce an
output to a given input. This allows us to uniquely
identify entire boards rather than just individual
chips. Because the PUF’s output also depends on
the board’s PDN this approach allows us to detect
hardware Trojans, malicious chips placed onto circuit
boards that carry out hardware-level attacks. These
chips’ presence subtly changes the impedance of the
PDN allowing us to detect them. The PUF itself as
well as its potential to identify hardware Trojans are
evaluated here using several different copies of an
FPGA development board.

I. I NTRODUCTION
Security of electronic systems at the hardware
level plays a critical role in maintaining the authenticity and integrity of digital communications
and data processing. Nearly every electronic system is built on a printed circuit board (PCB) that
provides routing between the different integrated
circuits (ICs) that comprise the system. Engineers
designing these circuits are responsible for protecting confidential data processed by the board and
adequately managing permissions to access these
data. Physically unclonable functions (PUFs) are
mappings from inputs, called challenges, to outputs,
called responses, that can enhance the security of a
system by providing certain security primitives. For
example, PUFs can provide services such as truly
random number generation, secret keys, and chip
identification, that serve as the back-bone for different security protocols. The mapping of the PUF
from inputs to outputs is unpredictable and unique
to a given chip but is reproducible. Traditional
PUFs leverage process variation in the manufacture
of silicon chips to implement this function.

As computer systems have grown more complex,
many PCBs have begun integrating different kinds
of computational resources into their designs. Field
Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs) are reconfigurable logic units that allow computer engineers
to implement custom logic circuits. Recently, designs across many different domains have begun
using FPGAs because of their capacity to accelerate
specific computations [7], [11], [17]. Due to their
extremely flexible nature, FPGAs open up many
security opportunities as well as vulnerabilities.
We specifically target them because their ubiquity
means that tools developed for them could relatively quickly and easily be deployed to many
systems in production.
In this work, we develop a PUF that derives
its randomness from process variation across the
entire power delivery network (PDN) of a PCB.
PUFs have many security applications such as
identification and authorization, and digitally signing computation results [3]. Originally designed to
authenticate specific chips [3], this work presents
a PUF capable of authenticating an entire printed
circuit board. We leverage the change in logic gate
delays as a function of supply voltage as well as
process variation in the manufacturing of printed
circuit boards and their components to precisely
characterize a given board’s PDN. In addition, we
show how this PUF can be applied to hardware
Trojan detection. Hardware Trojans are malicious
circuits covertly placed onto PCBs that can disrupt
a board’s normal operation [2]. Since they have
direct access to hardware resources, the threat they
pose cannot be mitigated with software patches
alone. Detecting the presence of these circuits
automatically allows compromised boards to be
discarded or fixed before they are deployed.
II. BACKGROUND
Modern PCBs typically have extremely complicated PDNs that can supply different voltages to the
various chips on the board. This PDN is typically
composed of switching and linear regulators as well
as several RLC networks that connect each IC to
the appropriate supply voltages. Because all the
circuits draw current from this PDN, changes in
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the power consumption of one chip will generally
create voltage fluctuations that affect all parts of
the PDN. With an adequate sensor, these voltage
fluctuations can be detected. This work is primarily
concerned with the RLC network that connects
different chips to the PDN. Process variation across
different boards of the same type can result in
different impedances observed between the power
rails of a given chip.
FPGAs have recently seen increased use as a
method to allow for dynamically reconfigurable
hardware accelerators in many applications [18].
They are often placed onto computer PCBs or
even integrated into System-on-Chips (SoCs) to
provide expanded computational capabilities. By
virtue of being placed on the same board (or
even within the same chip), the FPGA is able to
observe voltage fluctuations on the PCB’s PDN.
However, FPGAs typically have no way to directly
measure their supply voltage. Previous work has
shown that Time-to-Digital converters (TDCs) can
be implemented using standard FPGA logic primitives (buffers and latches) to measure changes in
delay through the gates of the FPGA [4]. [4] also
showed that these changes in delay very strongly
correlate with changes in the supply voltage of the
FPGA. Other work has shown that these (or similar)
sensors can detect voltage fluctuations caused by
other circuits on the FPGA [9], circuits on the same
SoC [18], and even from other chips on the same
PCB [10]. Each of these examples implemented a
TDC that was sensitive enough to perform power
side-channel attacks remotely.
Physically unclonable functions (PUFs) were developed to verify a particular piece of hardware,
such that an attacker could not spoof another chip.
A PUF must satsify the following constraints: it
must be easy to compute on the given system,
it must output what looks like random noise, it
must be unique from system to system including
different copies of the same design, and it must
be difficult for an attacker to reproduce even when
the attacker has physical access [15]. PUFs are
designed with challenge response pairs, typically
very large challenges and responses so that the PUF
is not reproducable using a large lookup table.

III. R ELATED W ORK
Previous work on PUFs has primarily focused
on identifying individual chips. Maiti et al. demonstrated a delay-based PUF that uses ring-oscillators
to create a small, portable implementation on an
FPGA [8]. This PUF utilizes very few of the available FPGA resources and allows a user to uniquely
identify a given FPGA (or IC if implemented as an
ASIC). More recently, Spenke et al. implemented
an arbiter PUF whose stages can be reconfigured
remotely [12]. Their design is similarly instantiated
in an FPGA in order to uniquely identify it. Their
design makes the PUF more resistant to attacks,
namely, learning-based attacks. Outside of FPGAs
themselves, Tehranipoor et al. showed that a PUF
could be created using just DRAM cells already
present on many computer circuit boards [14]. The
PUF makes use of the fact that the initial charge
on capacitors in the DRAM cells is random when
the device powers up. Their results show that this
approach can produce large (128 bit) PUFs that are
quite stable and unique across chips, making them
good candidates for use as security primitives.
While these PUFs have been shown to effectively
authenticate individual chips, existing literature has
not substantially addressed PUFs that fingerprint
entire PCBs. Previous methods have focused on
exploiting process variation within ICs rather than
across entire systems. By their very nature, these
PUFs cannot detect board-level modifications because the electrical properties they rely on to form
their PUF all reside within one chip. This work
departs from this paradigm by utilizing the PDN
of the board as the source of variation for our
PUF. Electrical changes to the board will then be
reflected in the characterization of the PDN and can
be detected with an appropriate sensing method.
Considering hardware Trojan detection, several
different approaches have been employed for identifying these malicious circuits. One method attempts
to analyze the bitstream or netlist of a circuit
to determine if it contains malicious logic [5],
[16]. However, these approaches have the obvious
disadvantage that they cannot detect any hardware
Trojans outside of the file that they analyze. If a
part is added to the board by an attacker, it is
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impossible for this analysis to reveal the threat.
Another approach attempts to detect the hardware
Trojan at runtime by examining the actions of
the circuitry and detecting anomalous behavior [6].
This partially remedies the previous problem by
looking at the overall behavior of the circuit. However, this method has a few main disadvantages.
First, detecting the hardware Trojan after or while
it is performing its attack could be too late. For
example, if the attack launched by the Trojan
crashes the system, its detection does not offer any
benefit. Additionally, this approach relies on being
able to somehow differentiate normal behavior from
that induced by the Trojan. If the Trojan performs
some unexpected action that the detection system
is not calibrated to find, the Trojan may be missed
entirely. Our approach departs from both of these
previous lines of work by attempting to detect the
very presence of the Trojan by its impact on the
impedance of the PCB’s PDN. This effect cannot
be eliminated or hidden because even if the Trojan
is not active its presence modifies the impedance
of the PDN.

different boards should generate different outputs.
In addition to these characteristics, we would also
like small modifications of the board’s PDN to
cause the output of these tests to change in order
to enable hardware Trojan detection.

IV. A PPROACH

Fig. 1: Block diagram of a TDC [4]. This design
uses a latch and series of buffers to detect how far
a clock edge propagates within half of the clock
period (propagation depth). This value can then be
saved in a flip-flop. In this case, the propagation
depth is 2.

We use the impedance of the PCB’s PDN as
a repeatable, unique signature to identify a given
board. Because of the ubiquity of FPGAs on modern circuit boards, we perform this characterization
from within an FPGA. This allows our method to
potentially be employed on many existing circuit
boards without any changes to the hardware on the
board.
The restrictions of using an FPGA mean that it is
difficult to treat this as a simple system identification problem: namely, we have only very coarse
control of the input and nonlinear, uncalibrated
measurement of the output. For these reasons, we
do not attempt to derive an analytic model of the
PDN or input; instead we simply examine several
different candidate characterizations and choose the
one that generates the most well-behaved outputs.
For the purposes of a PUF, well-behaved responses
will be stable and unique: multiple runs on the
same board of the same test will generate the
same output, but running the same test on two

A. Voltage Measurement
We use Time-to-Digital Converters (TDCs) to
measure voltage fluctuations of the PDN. TDCs
are circuits which convert a delay time to a digital
signal that can be directly manipulated. For this
work, we use the specific TDC presented in [4] to
maximize our time resolution. This TDC utilizes
a chain of buffers to delay a clock signal and
determine how far it propagates within half of a
clock period. Figure 1 shows a block diagram of
this device.

Measuring this delay gives us an indication of the
supply voltage on the board because gate delays
tend to increase as supply voltage drops, causing
the clock signal to propagate through fewer buffers.
By measuring the transient voltage fluctuations
when we stress the PDN by suddenly drawing
power at different frequencies, we can characterize
the overall impedance of the PDN as seen from the
power port of the FPGA. Although Figure 1 shows
the TDC delay line as a series of buffers, our design
uses two different primitives to actually implement
this. The “buffers” in our initial delay line are
composed of two NOT gates. For the observable
delay line, each “buffer” is one stage of a CARRY4
primitive. This was done because the delay time
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through a CARRY4 stage is generally lower than
the delay through a buffer or two NOT gates, which
makes the TDC more sensitive [4]. We do not use
CARRY4s for the initial delay line since sensitivity
there does not actually affect our measurements: we
opt for NOT gates (with a longer delay time) so
that we can use fewer resources and still achieve
the desired delay. The TDC has 32 buffer stages in
the initial delay line and 63 stages in the observable
delay line.
After the propagation depth is captured in the
TDC register, some basic post-processing is performed to remove noise and clear glitches, as well
as to compress the data into a smaller format. First,
for each bit in the TDC register except the leastsignificant bit (LSB), we take the AND of it with
the bit immediately less significant than it. This has
the effect of removing isolated 1s in the bit vector
that may have been caused by glitches in the latch.
Now, starting from the LSB, this cleaned vector
consists of a continuous string of 1s followed by
a continuous string of 0s. Since there are only 64
possible values this vector can take on (all zeros,
one 1 followed by zeros, two 1s followed by zeros,
etc.), we simply convert this vector into a 6 bit
number by adding up the values of all the bits.
This is equivalent to taking one plus the largest
index that is a 1 in the vector.
B. Frequency Response
To stimulate the PDN, we instantiate a large
number of ring-oscillators on the FPGA that can
be enabled or disabled. We refer to this group
of oscillators as a power virus. Each oscillator is
simply a NAND gate with its output tied to one of
its inputs and the other input serving as the enable
signal. When the enable signal is asserted, the ringoscillators begin switching which causes the virus
to alternate state very quickly, suddenly drawing a
large amount of power. We can then use the TDC
to measure the response of the PDN as it attempts
to counteract the change.
Figure 2 shows the overall block diagram of our
design. The TDC and power virus are implemented
in an FPGA embedded inside the Zynq-9000 SoC.
We also make use of the processor on board to

Zynq-9000 SoC
FPGA
PUF Module
ARM
Cortex
A9 APU

CLK
AXI Bus

DELAY

TDC
64

ENABLE
128

Power
Virus

Fig. 2: Block diagram of the system used to characterize the PDN of the circuit board. We utilize the
on board processor to communicate with a laptop
to read data out of the TDC.

facilitate communication with an outside computer.
The processor is able to directly access memory
elements inside our TDC so that it can configure
different measurement settings and read out the
TDC’s output after we make a measurement. We
use this processor to set the measurement window,
size of the power virus, and to specify the challenge
to be tested by the board. Additionally, it can
communicate with an external laptop via a standard
UART interface allowing us to collect and process
data on a separate computer.
In order to characterize the impedance of the
PDN, we wish to find its response to a varying
frequency of stimulation. To find this frequency
response, we vary the frequency with which we
turn the virus on and off. At each clock tick,
we record the propagation depth into the TDC in
block RAM. We then can measure statistics of the
output waveform measured by the TDC at different
frequencies to generate the frequency response of
the PDN.
At the same time that we collect a trace of the
propagation depth of the TDC, we compute the
energy contained in the waveform and subtract out
the energy due to its “DC-bias.” Specifically, if
we take measurements for K time steps and each
measurement has a propagation depth of dk , we
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PK−1 2
compute E =
of
k=0 dk as the total energy
PK−1
the waveform. We also compute S =
d
k=0 k
so that we can subtract out the energy contributed
by the offset of the wave rather than the oscillations
themselves.
After the entire trace has been collected and these
values have been accumulated in our hardware
design, we use the Zynq processor to read out E
and S and compute E 0 = E − S 2 /K, the original
energy minus the energy contributed by the DCoffset. Subtracting off the DC-offset makes the final
measurement more stable even when the overall
voltage supplied to the board changes (for example,
if the board is plugged into a different outlet). This
final value as well as the frequency at which it was
recorded is then sent over a serial bus to be recorded
on a computer. By performing this measurement
many times while oscillating the power virus at
different frequencies, we can approximate the value
of E 0 as a function of frequency. We use this
frequency response as a characterization of a given
board’s PDN.
Of course, the magnitude of this energy changes
if more or fewer measurements are taken. We decided to fix our recording window at 10, 000 clock
ticks (100µs) rather than average over the recorded
time in order to preserve as much information as
possible (division on the board could result in information lost due to rounding). Additionally, note that
the units of this energy are [depth]2 [clockticks],
which have no physical meaning. We do not attempt
to convert this measure to a physically significant
metric because it is extremely difficult to express
the actual source voltage as a function of propagation depth, and because this actually makes the
measure less informative. This is because propagation depth is also a function of process variation
in manufacturing the FPGA as well as the PCB
itself, meaning that even if we could directly find
the voltage corresponding to a given propagation
depth, doing so would make the effects of process
variation more difficult to observe.
C. Use as a PUF
For a challenge, our PUF uses a random binary
signal as the input to the enable pin of the power

Fig. 3: Pipeline of the processing we apply to the
random binary signal (RBS) to produce the PUF’s
response to a given challenge.
virus. This input was chosen because it has a low
crest factor (it delivers a lot of power without
having too high of an amplitude) and still stimulates
many frequencies [13]. The response is simply the
overall response of the PDN, measured as though
we were measuring the frequency response. We
use a 128-bit long signal and set the enable bit of
the power virus to each bit in sequence, wrapping
around to the beginning after we hit the end. We
advance to the next bit of the sequence each clock
tick and record the response to this challenge for
10,000 clock ticks. The final energy response (with
the DC term subtracted out) constitutes the response
to a given challenge. Figure 3 summarizes this
process.
D. Detection of Hardware Trojans
Hardware Trojans can be very small chips that
remain inactive until a specific “trigger” causes
them to perform some action [2]. Because the chips
can remain dormant, it is not sufficient to simply
measure power consumption of the board to detect
them. However, since these circuits will eventually
have to draw some power to perform their malicious
computations, they will likely be attached to the
PDN of the PCB somehow. Since the chip will
necessarily have some impedance, its addition will
subtly change the frequency response of the PDN.
Our approach allows us to detect this change even
if the chip remains dormant.
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Since our PUF is designed to derive some of its
variation from the PDN of the circuit board itself,
the addition of a hardware Trojan should impact the
response of the board to a given challenge. Thus,
we simply utilize the same types of challenges to
try to detect a Trojan. Since the change to the
PDN is somewhat subtle, the effect on the response
to a given challenge can be small depending on
the particular frequencies interrogated by a given
challenge. Thus, in order to reduce the error from
this variability, we examine the response to many
more challenges when explicitly checking for a
hardware Trojan rather than just examining the
difference between boards.
V. E XPERIMENTS
We used the ZedBoard [1] as a testbench for our
experiments. The ZedBoard has a Zynq-9000 SoC
that contains an ARM Cortex-A9 based processor
as well as programmable logic in the form of
look-up tables (LUTs) and flip-flops. The processor
allows us to easily interface between our hardware
design and external computer in order to record
measurements. We implemented a TDC using 32
double NOT gate buffers for the initial delay line
and 63 CARRY4 stages for the observable delay
line. We instantiated 128 groups of ring oscillators
that each contain 128 oscillators. This allows us to
finely control how much power the virus draws by
modulating the number of ring oscillators switching. By activating more ring oscillators, we draw
more current. We can specify which groups get
activated from the Zynq by supplying a 128-bit
bitmask. Once triggered by the Zynq, the hardware on the FPGA will activate the power virus
(whichever groups are specified by the bitmask) in
some pattern and simultaneously record the values
output by the TDC for 10, 000 clock ticks. Our
clock runs at 100M Hz so we record for a 100µs
window. In order to verify the operation of our
TDC, we began by detecting a simple step function
in which we record some baseline measurements
of the TDC before activating the power virus and
observe the change in TDC values. In addition,
we oscillated the power virus in a square wave
and examined the resulting readings from the TDC.

Figure 4 shows plots of the traces gathered from
these two experiments.
A. Frequency Responses
To characterize the frequency response of the
board, we oscillate the power virus in a square wave
at different frequencies and measure the energy of
the output, subtracting off the energy contributed by
the DC-offset. We activate 52 groups of the power
virus so that a total of 6656 ring-oscillators are
enabled when the virus is on. We record the board’s
response for 10, 000 clock ticks at 100M Hz and
compute the energy response (without the DC component) for many frequencies to find the overall frequency response. Starting with a period of 2 clock
ticks, we multiply this period by 1.01 between
measurements to obtain (logarithmically) equally
spaced measurements in the frequency domain.
Because the period of oscillation has to be an even
integer number of clock ticks, we must round the
new computed period up to the closest such value.
This is not a problem at higher periods, but when
the period is small, this limitation prevents us from
measuring with a small frequency resolution. For
this reason, our data at high frequencies are more
spaced out. In total, we measure the frequency
response at 395 frequencies from 10kHz up to
50M Hz.
We collect each frequency response 100 times
to capture noise in our measurements. Figure 5
shows a plot of these responses for one ZedBoard.
The response is remarkably consistent between runs
except for a few outliers at higher frequencies.
Using the unmodified board’s frequency response
as a baseline, we then tested to see if we could
detect changes to the board’s PDN by observing
how the changes affect the frequency response. We
model a hardware Trojan as a simple capacitor.
Although a real Trojan would undoubtedly contain
more components than this, this experiment makes
it more difficult to detect the presence of a Trojan
because the addition of more components would
likely result in larger changes to the response. Additionally, many Trojans remain dormant for long
periods of time, effectively electrically insulating
most of their components from the board’s PDN
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Fig. 5: Plot of 100 energy responses taken from the
same board. The response is remarkably consistent
except for a few outliers at high frequencies.
(a) Response of the PDN measured by the TDC when
we turn all of the ring oscillators on after 5, 000 clock
ticks (50µs). The voltage fluctuations are clearly visible
in the transient and the steady-state measurement is lower
while the power virus is on.

Fig. 6: The location of C206 on the Zedboard. [1]

(b) Measurements from the TDC when the power virus
oscillates in a square wave at 24, 801Hz. The measurements reflect the response we expect where the
propagation depth drops whenever the virus is on and
recovers when we turn it off.

Fig. 4: Plots of the initial measurements taken by
the TDC to verify its operation.

[6]. By testing whether or not we can detect just a
capacitor, we provide evidence that we could detect
these Trojans even while they remain dormant. We
examine the impact of connecting a 1µF , 100nF ,
and 10nF capacitor in parallel with a 10nF decoupling capacitor for the internal voltage of the FPGA
(specifically C206 [1]). Figure 6 shows the location
of this capacitor on the PCB. We then measured the
frequency response of the board 100 times in the
same way that we collected the baseline response.
Figure 7 shows how the energy response changes
as a result of attaching different capacitors to
the board in parallel with C206. The solid lines
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histogram that displays the frequency of different
distances between the unmodified board’s average
response to a challenge and a modified board’s average response to the same challenge. This distance
is normalized by computing the t-test statistic for
the difference between means which we calculate
using Equation 1:
|x̄1 − x̄2 |
t= q 2
s22
s1
n1 + n2

Fig. 7: The impact of adding capacitors to the PDN
on the frequency response of the board. The average
across 100 runs is shown as a solid line with the
shaded regions showing µ±3σ. This figure focuses
on the portion of the frequency response with the
largest divergence between the traces.

show the average response over 100 runs while the
shaded areas show ±3σ bounds (where σ is the
standard deviation of the response across runs of a
given frequency). This figure shows the area of the
responses that demonstrated the greatest divergence
which occurs at relatively high frequencies around
10M Hz. Additionally, the standard deviation is
quite small for lower frequencies around 1M Hz
compared to its value at about 20M Hz. This
corresponds to the outliers observed in the raw energy responses. Despite this increased variance, the
differences between the responses of the modified
board and the unmodified board are much larger
than the variations observed between runs using
the same configuration. This indicates that there is
detectable variation introduced by the addition of
a capacitor to the PDN that could be exposed as a
change to a challenge’s response.
To test our challenge framework we randomly
generated 1,000 128-bit challenges and collected
the energy responses that the board output. We
used the same challenges to distinguish between
an unmodified board and a board with a simulated
hardware Trojan attached as well as to differentiate between different boards. Figure 8 shows a

(1)

Here, x̄ is the average response of the board to a
given challenge over 100 runs and s is the standard
deviation of this response. n1 = n2 = 100 in this
case since we test every challenge 100 times.
In addition to testing modifications to the board
we also collected samples from the unmodified
board again to estimate how much the response
changes without modifications to the board between
runs and to compare this variation to that observed
when we actually modify the board. As the histograms show, the addition of extra components
causes the responses of more challenges to be
farther from the baseline response.
To test the uniqueness of our PUF between
boards we ran the same test as for detecting
hardware Trojans but tested on multiple different
PCBs. Again, we performed the same test twice on
the same board to compare how much our measurements change between runs with the variation
observed from changing boards entirely (shown as
“Board 0” in Figure 9). Figure 9 shows the results
of this experiment. For a given challenge, there
tends to be a much larger difference between boards
than results from simply adding a capacitor to the
PDN. In addition, the two boards tested show a
substantial difference between their responses as
well as between their response and the baseline
board, which is desirable because we would like
to distinguish between any two boards, not just
determine whether or not a board is different from
this particular baseline board.
VI. R ESULTS
These results indicate that a TDC implemented in
an FPGA is sufficiently sensitive to act as a sensor
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Fig. 8: Histograms of the t-statistic normalized distance between the average response of the baseline
and the average response of the test board to a
given challenge. Modifying the PDN of the board
results in a higher probability that the response to
a given challenge will be farther from the response
of the unmodified board. Here, we modified the
PDN by attaching different valued capacitors to a
decoupling capacitor (C206) near the FPGA.

for a PUF that secures an entire PCB rather than
a single chip. In order to identify a given board or
determine if it has been modified, we examine the
t-test statistic of the average response of the board
to a given challenge over 100 runs. To identify
a board it is generally sufficient to examine the
response to just one challenge. If we set a threshold
at t = 40 the probability of incorrectly rejecting a
board is just 0.9% and the probability of incorrectly
accepting a different board is just 2.3% in the worst
case.
In terms of detecting a hardware Trojan, using this same t = 40 threshold, the probability
of incorrectly accepting a board which has been
modified is substantially higher: we observed a
79%, 72%, and 71% false acceptance rate when
testing one challenge for a board with 1µF , 100nF ,
and 10nF capacitors attached respectively. This is
because the difference in impedance of the board’s
PDN induced by a single capacitor modification
is of course much less than that caused by swapping the entire board. Additionally, when switching
boards, we also leverage process variation in the
manufacture of the FPGAs themselves, resulting
in larger differences in the boards’ responses to a
given challenge. For this reason, it is necessary to
examine a board’s response to multiple different
challenges to accurately detect a hardware Trojan.
If we say trials where the response’s t-statistic
is above our threshold of 40 are “successes,” the
random variable number of successes Q has a
binomial distribution. If we test n independently
randomly selected challenges and we assume that
the true proportion of successes is s = 0.009 (i.e.
that the board is unmodified) then we can compute
the probability of observing at least Q successes
using Equation 2:
n  
X
n

Fig. 9: Histograms of the t-statistic normalized distance between the average response of the baseline
and the average response of the test board to a given
challenge. Different boards generate responses very
far from the original board’s response.

i=Q

i

(s)i (1 − s)n−i

(2)

Performing a standard p test, we can make the
determination that a given board has a hardware
Trojan if this resulting probability is less than some
α threshold such as α = 0.001. Let Q∗ be the
first number of successes for which this probability
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is less than or equal to α. We can then analyze
the probability that we falsely accept a board by
noting that if a board has been modified, the true
s value is (at least) s = 0.2. A false acceptance
occurs when s = 0.2 but Q < Q∗ . For example,
if we test 100 challenges, Q∗ = 5 if α = 0.001.
The probability of a false acceptance in this case
is 1.9 · 10−5 . Thus, by testing multiple challenges,
we can reduce the probability of false acceptance
and false rejection by more accurately estimating
the underlying probability distribution. This same
analysis can be applied to distinguishing between
boards as well. Testing 100 challenges 100 times
each takes just 107 ns = 10ms which is completely
feasible so long as this PUF is tested somewhat
rarely.
VII. D ISCUSSION AND F UTURE W ORK
Our final design uses about 25% of the FPGA’s
LUTs. This is primarily due to the power virus
which we made as large as possible to provide
the largest signal we could and also to make the
virus reconfigurable via a C program (so that it
did not require resynthesizing our design to change
the number of oscillators switching during our
measurement period). While this does leave most
of the FPGA still available, this PUF does require
a large amount of resources considering how rarely
it would be used in practice. Additionally, in our
experiments we used fewer than 7, 000 ring oscillators, meaning that we could reduce this footprint substantially by simply eliminating unused
oscillators. This improvement is expected to reduce
our utilization to about 13% of the FPGA: still
substantial, but markedly less.
The main limitation of this work was the strength
of the signal required to effectively differentiate
between boards and especially to detect hardware
Trojans. This problem manifests as a requirement
for many ring oscillators to be able to distinguish
between boards. This causes the PUF to take up
many resources in the FPGA and makes it less
suitable for actual use. As mentioned previously, we
could substantially reduce the required resources by
simply eliminating unused ring oscillators. However, this improvement alone would likely be insuf-

ficient to bring the resource utilization down to a
reasonable level. An interesting future direction for
this work would be to determine if a smaller power
fluctuation can be induced to still achieve detection
of hardware Trojans and board identification. In
addition, we would like to investigate a more efficient way to produce the same voltage fluctuations.
The combination of these two improvements could
substantially reduce the footprint of our PUF and
make it more suitable for production use alongside
other logic.
Another interesting future direction would be to
test this PUF’s ability to detect hardware Trojans
co-resident on the FPGA. Many hardware Trojans
are introduced in firmware updates rather than via
physical chips, so detecting these threats would
make the PUF more effective at protecting PCBs.
This provides further motivation for reducing the
size of the PUF so that it can always sit on the
FPGA without disrupting an engineer’s ability to
place other logic on the chip.
VIII. C ONCLUSION
We present a novel PUF that serves to authenticate an entire PCB rather than a single integrated
circuit. By leveraging process variation in the manufacture of the components of the PDN, our PUF
can uniquely identify a given board based on its responses to a set of challenges. In addition, because
the response to a given challenge is influenced by
the entire PDN, this PUF can detect the presence
of hardware Trojans using the same tests used to
identify the board. Because any hardware Trojan
will necessarily have some impedance, its presence
changes the response of the PUF. This detection
can be performed using a reasonable number of
challenges.

11

IX. A PPENDIX
In this section we describe various experiments
and techniques that were tried that were not included in the main report because they were not
as effective or were less relevant than the sections we did include. We discuss the sensitivity
of our detection scheme to the placement of the
hardware Trojan, different frequency responses we
analyzed, variations on the challenge-response pair
we present, and conclude with some remarks about
the TDC itself.
A. Sensitivity to Placement of the Capacitor
An experiment we performed that had a negative
result was an attempt to detect capacitors that were
placed at the peripheral module (PMOD) ports of
the ZedBoard. We collected the power response of
a board with and without the capacitor to compare
and see if there was a qualitative difference between
the responses. Figure 10 shows the results: the
responses are essentially indistinguishable.

Fig. 10: Power responses of the board with and
without a capacitor attached. This capacitor was
connected between the 3.3V and ground rails of
a PMOD port (JD). The responses are essentially
indistinguishable.
This result was somewhat expected. The PMOD
ports are very far from the FPGA that runs the
voltage monitor, so the capacitor should only very

minutely change the response of the PDN.. Additionally, the capacitor was attached to the 3.3 V
power supply while the FPGA’s core voltage is
attached to a 1 V network. These two networks are
powered by different regulators, and so we expect
changes on one to be difficult to detect on the other.
While it would have been encouraging if there was
substantial difference between the two responses,
this is a limitation of our implementation. Fortunately, Trojans located far from the FPGA itself
are less suited to stealing information because it
is also more difficult for them to covertly gather
information for the same reason that it is difficult
to detect them in the first place. Thus, it is unlikely
that a real hardware Trojan would be placed here
and if it were, it would be very difficult for it to
affect the operation of the board.
B. Other Frequency Responses
Besides using the energy response of the PCB’s
PDN we also experimented with other types of
responses to the power virus oscillation, namely,
the peak-to-peak response as well as different components of the Fourier transform of the signal.
1) Peak-to-Peak Response: We computed the
peak-to-peak of the TDC signal at different frequencies to find the peak-to-peak frequency response of the trace. We experimented with this
response because it is extremely easy to compute
on the FPGA itself which allows us to quickly
test many frequency points and re-sample each
frequency to gain insight into the noise of the
response. Figure 11 shows plots of many frequency
responses collected across different boards and
SoCs.
As is clear from the figure, the response is neither
stable nor very unique between different boards.
For this reason, although it is an easy statistic
to calculate, we decided to pursue responses that
maintain more information from the original timedomain trace.
2) Fourier Transform Response: We tested using
different components of the Fourier transform as
the frequency response. Figure 12 shows frequency
responses obtained by taking just the power at the
fundamental frequency (12a) as well as from taking
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Fig. 11: Peak-to-peak frequency response across
different PCBs and SoCs. Each graph represents
the sum of ten runs for every frequency.

the power in the entire bandwidth of the response
(excluding the DC component) (12b).
The power response across the entire bandwidth
is both more stable and more unique than examining just the power at the fundamental frequency.
However, while the power response in the whole
bandwidth does look promising, we decided against
pursuing Fourier analysis as a method of producing
a response from the board. This decision was made
because of the difficulty of computing the Fourier
transform. If we compute it off-board on a dedicated computer, there is a very tight information
bottleneck in that we have to read the propagation
depth of the TDC at all 10, 000 time steps. Because
the UART connection to the board is relatively
slow, this approach would severely increase the
time it took to compute each response. We then experimented with computing the Fourier coefficients
on the FPGA. However, this proved too imprecise
to actually be useful. Finally, since the power in the
whole bandwidth is more informative anyway, we
don’t actually need all of the information provided
by the full Fourier transform, because we can
compute the same thing using the RMS value of
the TDC propagation depth (along with its average
value to subtract out the DC-component). Thus, this
analysis did not really offer any advantages over
computing RMS values, so we did not pursue it

(a) Frequency power response at the fundamental frequency of the power virus’ oscillation.

(b) Frequency power response in the entire bandwidth of
our sensor (excluding the DC component).

Fig. 12: Fourier transform responses.

farther.
3) Including the DC-offset in the Response: We
initially tried gathering the energy response of the
board without subtracting out the DC component.
If we do not subtract out this energy, our characterization of the PDN is not robust to small changes
in the supply voltage to the overall board. Figure
13 shows how changing which outlet the board is
plugged into causes the response to shift, making
true differences in the PDN more difficult to detect.
Note that these two outlets were located in different
buildings, one in a residential area, and one in a
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more commercial area, but the same board was
tested in both cases.

Fig. 13: Energy response of the PDN with the DC
term included. The only thing that changed between
these two runs was which wall outlet was plugged
into.
As a result, we modified the statistics we collected so that the DC energy contribution could be
subtracted from the response value. This resulted
in a more stable characterization of a given board
as discussed in the report.
C. Variants of the Challenge
1) Virus Placement Challenge: Our initial attempt at using this as a PUF was to create 128
groups of 128 ring oscillators and make a challenge a 128-bit bitmask specifying which virus
groups should actually oscillate during our TDC
measurement. This gave us a total of 16,384 ring
oscillators. We were limited to about 128 oscillators
in each group because of the limited number of
LUTs on the FPGA. This idea did not work as
a PUF for two main reasons. First, changing the
configuration of oscillators (while keeping the total
number the same) did not substantially change the
board’s energy response. Additionally, even adding
one or two more groups of oscillators had very
little effect. Second, many potential bitmasks would
have to be ruled out because, based on previous
experiments, the board’s PDN could only support

oscillation of about 7,000 ring oscillators at a time
without crashing due to the large magnitude of the
voltage fluctuations. Thus, this idea did not end up
producing a usable PUF.
2) Challenge Scaling: One attempt at using this
sensor to develop a PUF involved using a 128-bit
long string as an oscillation pattern for the power
virus. That is, the string encoded when the virus
should be enabled and when it should be disabled.
In order to have the virus oscillating during a
majority of our 10,000 clock tick measurement
window (to make the signal sufficiently strong),
we set the virus’ enable pin to a given value of
the bit string for 64 clock ticks before moving on
to the next bit of the challenge. This meant that
the virus would be controlled for 8192 clock ticks.
After this point, the enable pin simply remained in
whatever state it was last set to. This idea did not
produce substantial differences in responses when
we added different capacitors to the board. This is
because, since each bit of the challenge is repeated
for so long, this format does not allow for the
interrogation of high frequencies, where different
responses are actually visible. Thus, we opted to
simply repeat the challenge bit string so that high
frequencies would also be interrogated.
3) Faster Challenge Clock: We also experimented with clocking the enable pin to the power
virus at a higher frequency so that the board’s
response at higher frequencies could be collected.
We selected a 250M Hz clock for the power virus
for a couple of reasons. First, we found from several
experiments that higher frequencies would yield
better variation across boards than lower frequencies. The smallest we can make the period of the
power virus activation is 2 clock ticks, so we are
able to clock the power virus up to 125M Hz. Since
we still only record measurements at 100M Hz, it
is possible that this causes most of the energy to
be contained in frequency components above the
Nyquist frequency (50M Hz). We do not believe
that this is a problem because we do not attempt to
reconstruct the original signal. We only examine the
overall energy response, so frequency aliasing does
not affect this response. This is related to the second
reason that we chose 250M Hz for the clock fre-
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quency: if we had chosen 200M Hz and switched
our virus at the maximum frequency of 100M Hz,
nearly all of its energy (in the fundamental as well
as at harmonics) would alias to 0Hz which we
subtract out. Thus, we use 250M Hz so that our
maximum frequency does not alias to DC.
D. Analysis of the TDC
1) TDC Using Only NOT Gates: Our initial
design of the TDC used two NOT gates as a buffer
for both the initial and observable delay lines.
This produced reasonable results, but we eventually
moved to the CARRY4 primitive for the observable
delay line because [4] suggests that the lower delay
through this primitive results in a more sensitive
sensor (the same change in supply voltage will
generate a larger change in propagation depth).
We did observe this effect to some extent, but it
was not extremely substantial; the typical baseline
propagation depth increased from about 28 to about
31.
2) Time-Domain Response: The time-domain
behavior of the TDC measurements exhibited some
unintuitive behavior that we were never able to
explain. When examining the step response of
the propagation depth, we see that it actually initially increases before dropping below its baseline
level. Depending on the number of ring-oscillators
switching, the steady state propagation depth with
the power virus enabled was sometimes higher
than the steady state depth before enabling the
virus. Since the propagation depth should be related
to the supply voltage in the same direction, this
result seems to indicate that the supply voltage
actually rises when we draw more current. We
attempted to verify this result using an oscilloscope
and measuring the voltage across the current sense
resistor on the ZedBoard, but this measurement was
so noisy that no conclusion could be drawn from it.
Measurements closer to the FPGA itself were not
made because of the difficulty of safely accessing
these pins.
We hypothesize that the higher steady-state voltage sometimes observed with the power virus enabled could be the result of the power delivery
network overcompensating for the current draw

from the FPGA. However, the initial increase in
propagation depth observed in the transient response is much more difficult to explain. Examining the BOM of the ZedBoard [1], the linear
regulators closest to the FPGA have transient load
responses on the order of microseconds or tens of
microseconds, whereas the time resolution achieved
with the TDC is 10ns. Thus, we believe it unlikely
that we are simply missing the downward spike and
the regulators are compensating before we can take
our next measurement. It’s possible that this spike
is actually introduced by our sensor itself, although
we are unsure of the exact mechanism by which
this would occur.

15

R EFERENCES
[1] Zedboard.
[2] Swarup Bhunia, Michael S Hsiao, Mainak Banga, and
Seetharam Narasimhan. Hardware trojan attacks: Threat
analysis and countermeasures. Proceedings of the IEEE,
102(8):1229–1247, 2014.
[3] Blaise Gassend, Dwaine Clarke, Marten Van Dijk, and
Srinivas Devadas. Silicon physical random functions. In
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Computer and
communications security, pages 148–160, 2002.
[4] Dennis RE Gnad, Fabian Oboril, Saman Kiamehr, and
Mehdi B Tahoori. Analysis of transient voltage fluctuations
in fpgas. In 2016 International Conference on FieldProgrammable Technology (FPT), pages 12–19. IEEE,
2016.
[5] Kento Hasegawa, Masao Yanagisawa, and Nozomu Togawa. Trojan-feature extraction at gate-level netlists and
its application to hardware-trojan detection using random
forest classifier. In 2017 IEEE International Symposium
on Circuits and Systems (ISCAS), pages 1–4. IEEE, 2017.
[6] Amey Kulkarni, Youngok Pino, and Tinoosh Mohsenin.
Svm-based real-time hardware trojan detection for manycore platform. In 2016 17th International Symposium on
Quality Electronic Design (ISQED), pages 362–367. IEEE,
2016.
[7] George Lentaris, Konstantinos Maragos, Dimitrios
Soudris, Xenophon Zabulis, and Manolis Lourakis.
Single-and multi-fpga acceleration of dense stereo vision
for planetary rovers. ACM Transactions on Embedded
Computing Systems (TECS), 18(2):1–27, 2019.
[8] Abhranil Maiti, Raghunandan Nagesh, Anand Reddy, and
Patrick Schaumont. Physical unclonable function and
true random number generator: a compact and scalable
implementation. In Proceedings of the 19th ACM Great
Lakes symposium on VLSI, pages 425–428, 2009.
[9] Falk Schellenberg, Dennis RE Gnad, Amir Moradi, and
Mehdi B Tahoori. An inside job: Remote power analysis
attacks on fpgas. In 2018 Design, Automation & Test
in Europe Conference & Exhibition (DATE), pages 1111–
1116. IEEE, 2018.
[10] Falk Schellenberg, Dennis RE Gnad, Amir Moradi, and
Mehdi B Tahoori. Remote inter-chip power analysis sidechannel attacks at board-level. In 2018 IEEE/ACM International Conference on Computer-Aided Design (ICCAD),
pages 1–7. IEEE, 2018.
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